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Case No.
13862

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a suit by Plaintiff-Respondent against Associated Bolt & Supply Company for goods sold on account
and against Defendants and Appellants Farrell J. Jones
and A. Wayne Robinson upon a guaranty of that account.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
Judgment was granted against the Defendants as
prayed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Only Defendants Farrell J. Jones and A. Wayne
Robinson have appealed and seek reversal of the trial
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court's findings that they had guaranteed the obligation
of Associated Bolt & Supply Company to Respondent.
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' Statement of Facts lacks the detail necessary to give this Court the flavor of what transpired
between the parties and resulted in the Trial Court
granting judgment to Respondent (herein "All Metals").
The first two paragraphs of Appellants' Statement of
Facts has brought the reader to that point on January
20, 1972 (not "Early in 1973" as stated in the first full
paragraph on p. 3 of Appellants' brief), where the officers and attorney for All Metals were in Pocatello, Idaho,
meeting with A. Wayne Robinson, president of Associated Bolt & Supply Co. (herein "Robinson" and "Associated Bolt"), Farrell J. Jones (herein "Jones") and
their counsel, Earl J. Peck. (R. 139, 140; 166, 167)
As Appellants indicate in their Statement of Facts,
the purpose of the meeting was to enable All Metals and
its officers and attorney to obtain evidence in connection
with its suit against All Metals' former president, Walter
Hibbard, and F & R Enterprises and to enable Associated
Bolt and its officers to convince All Metals that Associated Bolt and Robinson had not been involved in any
conspiracy with Hibbard to defraud All Metals. By so
doing, it was the desire of Associated Bolt and Robinson
to be dismissed from the law suit (R. 138).
Since the law suit against F & R Enterprises had, in
effect, closed down its business and since F & R Enterprises had been Associated Bolt's primary source of sup-
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ply of material, at the meeting Jones requested Richard
E. Watts (herein "Watts"), one of the officers of All
Metals, to agree to have All Metals continue to supply
Associated Bolt. In response, Mr. Watts said that due
to his past experience with Associated Bolt, it would
be necessary that some form of guaranty be furnished
All Metals in order for it to do business with Associated
Bolt. (R. 141) Both Jones and Robinson agreed to
guaranty the account, according to the testimony of Mrs.
Leslie Curtis (R. 167) and Watts (R. 141). While Jones
denies having given the guaranty, he does not deny that
the conversation with respect to the guaranty took place,
or that Watts insisted on one. (R. 186,187)
Counsel for All Metals indicated that the guaranty
should be evidenced in writing and that he would prepare a written guaranty for submission. (R. 141, 187)
On the strength of the guaranty, All Metals began to
supply merchandise to Associated Bolt (PI. Ex. 4). The
written guaranty was prepared and submitted by Watts
to Jones and Robinson in February, 1972 (R. 142; PL
Ex. 1). It should be noted that the guaranty as submitted
to Jones and Robinson called for each of them to guarantee the account of Associated Bolt to All Metals.
In March, 1972, Jones called Watts and told him
that the guaranty should be changed by inserting the
words "beginning with January 1, 1972" in relation to
the past debt of Associated Bolt. He explained to Watts
that he felt that it was necessary to divorce the guaranty
from any activity of Associated Bolt prior to that date.
In this conversation, Jones also pointed out that his middle initial should be changed from A. to J. (R. 143).
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Contemporaneous with this telephone call, Mr. Watts
jotted down on his copy of the guaranty the changes
which were to be made. (R. 143, 144; PL Ex. 1) Jones
requested no other changes to the form of guaranty
during this call. Jones' testimony regarding this telephone
conversation deserves to be read. He had been asked
about the conversation with Watts and the following
examination took place in part by counsel and part by
the Court (R. 203, 204) :
Q. I see. So you called him and you talked
to him, but you really didn't express indignation
at having received a guaranty with your name on
it, you simply said I think we ought to make some
changes; and the changes were, put a beginning
date, and change your name so it was accurate?
A. I don't recall. I could have said, why did
you put my name in there? I don't remember that
if I mentioned it or not to him.
THE COURT: At that time you didn't express any objections to guaranteeing the account
of Asoociated Bolt, did you?
THE WITNESS: I told him that if I signed
the guaranty it would have to be changed, the
writing.
THE COURT: That isn't what I asked you.
You didn't, on the phone, express any objections
to guaranteeing Associated Bolts account?
THE WITNESS:

Not specifically, no.

THE COURT: Well, these accounts were
accounts they were then purchasing, not old accounts, that's why you wanted the date on it?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
THE WITNESS: Yes, I wanted a beginning date.
THE COURT: You were willing to go back
and guarantee the accounts from January 1st on?
THE WITNESS:

Yes.

THE COURT: That meant some deliveries
had already been made?
THE WITNESS: Oh, I'm certain there were.
The guaranty was retyped to include the changes
requested by Jones and, as changed, was mailed to Jones
with a letter of transmittal on March 23, 1972 (R. 144;
PL Ex. 3).
In reliance on the existence of the guaranty, merchandise was being shipped to Associated Bolt on a continuing basis. As of March 21, 1972, the account stood
at $3,985.19 (PI. Ex. 4). In May, 1972, All Metals received a check from Robinson purporting to be drawn
on the account of "R & J Products Company." Prior to
receipt of this check, Watts had had a telephone conversation with Robinson who told him that he was sending a check drawn on "J & R Products" to Watts to
apply on the account. Watts testimony was that it was
understood between Robinson and himself that this would
apply on the Associated Bolt account because that was
the only account that All Metals had with Robinson.
There was no account with J & R Products. (R. 151,
152) The check of J & R Products when received actually said R & J Products for the same address as that
previously used by Associated Bolt and was drawn on an
account on which Farrell ones was a signator. (PL Exs.
5 and 8) A later check was reecived by All Metals ap-
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parently printed on the same form, bearing the same
bank account number, but on which the R & J had been
stricken and J & R had been written in pen over it.
(PL Ex. 6)
Late in June, 1972, Jones called Watts and stated
that he had further changes to make in the guaranty,
to-wit: that name "J & R Products" be substituted for
"Associated Bolt & Supply Co." (R. 145, 146, 190) At
that time, Watts says he told Jones that he found no
objection to that approach, just so long as the amount
of money on the account was secure, to which Jones
agreed. (R. 145, 146) According to the testimony of
both Jones and Watts, this was the first mention of the
name of J & R Products in connection with the guaranty.
At the time this conversation took place, Associated Bolt
was indebted to All Metals in the amount of at least
$10,800.42. (PL Ex., 4)
In October, 1972, Mr. Earl Osborne, President of
All Metals, called Jones on two separate occasions. Osborne's uncontradicted testimony is that in both conversations Jones stated that he was in the process of disposing of some assets and when this was accomplished
he would be able to pay the All Metals account. At no
time during these conversations did Jones ever object to
the payment of the debt nor did he deny being personally
liable for the account; on the contrary, he agreed to send
the money. (R. 175, 176, 177)
After several requests for payment, All Metals brought
this action.
It should be noted here that for a period of at least
eight months prior to the trial, Respondent repeatedly
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attempted to obtain the deposition of A. Wayne Robinson.
Appellants' counsel, on various occasions during this period, represented to Respondent's counsel that A. Wayne
Robinson was seriously ill and could not have his deposition taken.
At the time of trial, A. Wayne Robinson was critically ill and was unavailable to testify. Appellants' counsel was unable to state whether Mr. Robinson would ever
be able to testify. (R. 208, 209)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED TO CLAIM THE
BENEFIT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

The law is well settled in virtually every jurisdiction
that the statute of frauds "should be used for the purpose
of preventing fraud and not as a shield by which frauds
can be perpetrated." Jacobson v. Cox, et aL, 115 Utah
102, 202 P2d 714, 720 (1949); Trollope v. Koerner,
106 Ariz. 10, 470 P.2d 91 (1970); LeBlond v. Wolfe, 83
C.A. 2d 282, 188 P.2d 278 (1948); Yucca Mining and
Petroleum Company v. Howard C. Phillips Oil Company,
69 N.Mex. 281, 365 P.2d 925 (1961). Appellants have,
in effect, requested this Court to allow them to perpetrate a fraud on All Metals under the auspices of the
Statute of Frauds.
The Findings and Conclusions of the lower court,
well supported by the facts, establish that All Metals is
entitled to its judgment against Jones and Robinson under
two types of estoppel, promissory estoppel and estoppel
in pais.
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The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the definition
of promissory estoppel contained in §90 of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts. As stated in Ravarino v.
Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953) :
A promise which the promissor should reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance of a
definite and substantial character on the part of
the prpmissee and which does induce such action
or forebearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by the enforcement of the promise.
260 P.2d at 575.
While historically the doctrine of promissory estoppel has been applied as a substitute for consideration,
Id., this Court, along with many other jurisdictions, has
extended the doctrine to situations involving the Statute
of Frauds "when a misrepresentation as to the future
operates as an abandonment of an existing right on the
part of the party making the misrepresentation." [Citations omitted] Ravarino, supra, at 575.
The promise to reduce an agreement to writing may
be a suffiicent abandonment of an existing right to satisfy
the doctrine of promissory estoppel if the element of
fraud is sufficiently present. Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d
386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956).
In Easton v. Wycoff, supra, this Court enumerated
the type of circumstance in which an offer to reduce a
contract to writing is a sufficient abandonment of an
existing right to support the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The Court quoted with approval comment f., Section
178, A.L.I. Restatement of The Law of Contracts which
reads, in appropriate part:
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. . . and a promise to make a memorandum, if
similarly relied on, may give rise to an effective
promissory estoppel if the Statute would otherwise
operate to defraud. [Emphasis supplied]
In other words, the Restatement emphasizes
the element of fraud and requires "substantial
action" upon the promise to put the contract in
writing in order for enforcement of the contract
to be granted, and the cases appear to bear this
out. 295 P.2d at 334.
Although one may not be estopped from asserting
the Statute of Frauds merely because an oral contract
has been acted upon, there are circumstances in which
reliance on an oral agreement gives rise to just such an
estoppel. Appellants cite at Page 15 of their brief a portion of 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes of Frauds, §567 which
seemingly indicates that they are not so estopped. However, if the section is read in its entirety and in conjunction with the Restatement Section utilized by this Court
in Easton v. Wycoff, supra, it is obvious that this case
cries aloud for the application of the doctrine.
73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statute of Frauds, §567 states in
addition to the language cited in Appellants brief the
following:
The doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute of
frauds against a claim or defense based upon an
oral contract is founded upon the general principles of estoppel in pais. [Citations omitted] The
vital principle is that he who by his language or
conduct leads another to do, upon the faith of an
oral agreement, which he would not otherwise
have done, and changes his position to his prejudice, will not be allowed to subject such person
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to loss or injury, or to avail himself of the change
to the prejudice of such other party. . . . It must
be made to appear that there was such language
or conduct on the part of the person against whom
the estoppel is alleged as to make it a fraud for
him to gainsay what he expressly admitted by
his words or tacitly confessed by his silence. [Citations omitted] Actual intent or design to mislead
or deceive is not, however, essential. . . . It is clear,
however, that an estoppel to assert the statute of
frauds does not arise merely because an oral contract within the statute has been acted upon by
the promissee and not performed by the promissor.
[Citations omitted] Neither does an estoppel arise
upon the mere refusal to make a writing as agreed.
[Citations omitted] Where the entire transaction
leading up to the making of the verbal contract
is open and free from fraud or false representation, the subsequent failure to carry out that
contract cannot of itself constitute an estoppel;
otherwise, the court would open the door to the
nullification of the statute of frauds. [Citations
omitted] But even though the failure to reduce to
writing a contract as agreed does not ordinarily
constitute such fraud as to estop a person from
asserting the statute, yet if he is thereby induced
to change his position in a substatnial respect,
and so that such position cannot be restored, estoppel arises to preclude such assertion. [Citations
omitted] [Emphasis supplied]
Under the facts of the present case, there is much
more than mere action on an oral contract. There is also
much more than an offer to reduce a contract to a
writing and a subsequent refusal to do so. Here Jones
and Robinson guaranteed the account in question. Within

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
a few days of this conversation, All Metals began to
sell goods on the strength of that guaranty. (PL Ex. 4)
When a written guaranty was presented to him six
weeks later, Jones did not make any objection to the fact
that he was named on it nor did he say anything to Watts
that would lead anyone to think the guaranty was not in
effect. And he knew that merchandise was being shipped
on a continuing basis (R. 203, 204, quoted in the Statement of Facts of this Brief).
After Jones suggested changes to the first guaranty
submitted to him (none of which went to question his
own personal liability thereunder) a modified form was
submitted to him on March 23, 1972. (R. 144; PL Ex. 3).
Jones made no protest concerning the guaranty for three
months thereafter, during which time All Metals continued to supply merchandise to Associated Bolt. By the
time Jones got around to talking about the additional
changes he wanted to make in the guaranty, the account
was in excess of $10,000. (PL Ex. 4)
Even at this late stage of the transaction, Watts made
no objection to the requested change in the guaranty
from Associaed Bolt & Supply Company to J & R Products, because it was Watts5 understanding that the guaranty would still cover the materials which were sold on
this account. As stated by Watts in his testimony (R. 145,
146):
A. And his request was that he wanted to
eliminate the name of Associated Bolt entirely
from the document, and insert in its place J & R
Products, the name J & R Products. And his reason
for wanting to do this —
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THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

J & R what?
J & R Products.
Thank you.

A. (continuing) — and his reason for wanting to do this, naturally, was that he did not want
to associate himself with any part of the Associated Bolt & Supply. And I told Mr. Jones that I
found no objection to that approach, just so long
as the amount of money on the account was secure.
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
told him —

Was what?
Was secure.
Say that again, now. You

THE WITNESS: I told Mr. Jones that I
took no objection to changing the name from
Associated Bolt to J & R Products just so long as
the business that had been done on the account
was still secure.
Q.

What did he say to that?

A.

Fine. He agreed.

Q.

So then what happened?

A. Then the document, of course, was sent
to us and we received it sometime in the month
of June.
Q. When you received it, was it changed in
the manner that it is now changed by pen and ink?
A. Yes.
At this time All Metals was still operating on the
reasonable belief that Jones and Robinson had guaranteed its account with Associated Bolt.
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In uncontradicted testimony, Earl Osborne, an officer of All Metals, stated that in two separate telephone
conversations he had with Jones in October, 1972, Jones
stated that he was in the process of disposing of some
assets and when this was accomplished he would be able
to send All Metals a check. (R. 175, 176, 177).
At no time during the entire course of dealings between the parties did Jones ever repudiate the initial
oral guaranty. He was aware that goods had been sold
and at no time did he ever state that those goods were
not guaranteed by him. In fact the first time All Metals
learned that Jones considered the guaranty inoperative
was when it received his Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint.
The above enumerated conduct also gives rise to an
estoppel in pais. As stated in §567 of 73 Am. Jur. 2d
supra, the doctrine of estoppel to assert the statutes of
frauds is founded upon the general principles of estoppel
in pais. In this case, all the elements of estoppel in pais
have been met.
As stated in Grover, et al v. Gam, et al, 23 Utah 2d
441, 464P.2d 598 (1970),
. . . that under the doctrine or principle of estoppel in pais one may by his acts or conduct away
from the court prevent himself from denying in
court the effect or result of those acts. We respect
a definition of long standing taken from Black's
Law Dictionary:
An estoppel by the conduct or admissions of
a party * * * it is, and always was, a familiar
principle in the law of contracts. It lies at the
foundation of morals and is a cardinal point
in the exposition of promises, that one shall be
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bound by the state of facts which he has induced another to act upon. 464 P.2d at 602
In the instant case, the facts go beyond the mere
application of promissory estoppel. The subsequent representation and the silence of Jones with knowledge that
goods were being sold on the strength of the guaranty
establish a series of acts or conduct which induced All
Metals to act. Jones is bound by the state of those facts
and by his conduct away from court and is prevented
from denying in court the effect or result of those acts.
The Appellant has cited in its brief three Utah cases
involving the principles of estoppel, Ravarino v. Price,
supra; Easton v. Wycoff, supra, and McKinnon v. The
Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints,
Utah 2d,
529 P.2d
434 (1974) [incorrectly cited in Appellants Brief as Malcolm v. The Corporation, etc.]. Each of these cases, although setting forth the law with respect to promissory
estoppel as it applies to the statute of frauds, held against
the application of the doctrine in the particular factual
circumstances.
In Easton v. Wycoff, the court held that the doctrine
of promissory estoppel did not apply because there was
insufficient reliance and injury as required by the doctrine, 295 P.2d at 335. In all three cases, the facts were
far less favorable for the application of the doctrine
than in the present case. Also, there were no facts which
would support the application of the doctrine of estoppel
in pais.
In none of the aforementioned Utah cases was there
established a series of representations or omissions fol-
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lowed by a course of conduct between the parties which
extended over many months and which was justifiably
relied upon. Each of the above cases contained only an
initial set of representations and then a subsequent reliance with no continuous reliance and a course of dealing
established thereafter.
From the foregoing, it has been amply demonstrated
that the doctrine of promissory estoppel and estoppel
in pais should apply to the facts herein and Defendants
should be estopped to rely upon the statute of frauds as
a defense.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED SOUND DISCRETION IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT.

Defendants' concede that whether or not to allow
an amendment of a complaint is within the discretion
of the trial court. Under the terms of Rule 15 (a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend a complaint shall be freely given when justice so requires. Also,
the Appellate Court will not ordinarily disturb the ruling
of the lower court unless it is apparent that such court
has abused its discretion. Johnson v. Continental Casualty
Company, 78 Utah 18, 22, 300 Pac. 1032 (1931).
Defendants contend in their brief that they were prejudiced by the allowance of the amendment in two ways:
(1) because they could not confer on the matter with
Robinson, and (2) because they were not allowed to
undertake discovery with respect to the claim.
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With respect to the first claim, the Defendants state
that they were prejudiced because they were unable to
consult Robinson, the President of Associated Bolt, with
respect to the new theory that was alleged in the amendment. Counsel for Defendants states that "in addition to
being a party, he [meaning Robinson] would have been
an important witness and Defendants were entitled to a
reasonable opportunity to have him present if the case
were to be tried on the oral guaranty." (Appellants Brief,
Page 8) Counsel makes no representation as to the nature
of Robinson's testimony.
Appellant then cites the portion of the court record
wherein the trial court establishes that at the time of
trial Robinson was unavailable because of his physical
condition. However, it was established then by the admission of Defendants' counsel that at the time of trial
counsel had no idea whether Robinson would ever be
available at any future date.
Defendants' counsel intimates that if the trial court
would have given him a reasonable amount of time, he
would have been able to produce Robinson. Such is not
the case.
Although not part of the record, counsel for the
Plaintiff can represent to the Court that for several
months prior to the time of trial, Plaintiff's counsel
made repeated attempts to take the deposition of Robinson. Counsel has in its file a copy of a letter from Robinson's doctor, dated April 11, 1974, stating that Robinson
was currently incapacitated. That letter was sent to
Plaintiff's counsel by the counsel for Defendants in order
to satisfy Plaintiff's demands that Robinson be produced
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for his deposition. Further, the letter which Defendants'
counsel sent states that Robinson had been acutely ill
since the fall of 1973, a year prior to the date of trial
Respondents' counsel can and does represent to this
Court that for a period of time of at least eight months
prior to the time of trial, it was repeatedly represented
to them by the counsel for Defendants that Robinson
was critically ill and could not be made aavilable for his
deposition.
These matters were extensively discussed with the
trial judge in chambers prior to the beginning of the
trial. (R. 135) From the foregoing, it is obvious, that at
the time of the trial, there was no possible representation
which Defendants could make to the Court which would
indicate that Robinson would ever be available for the
taking of his deposition. To continue the trial at that
particular time for this reason would have meant to continue the trial for an indefinite period of time. It should
be noted that in the Judge's opening remarks (R. 134)
the Judge stated that if the Defendant was handicapped
because of the amendment, it was the Court's intention
to grant a short continuance to allow the Defendant to
properly prepare. At the termination of the trial, as is
amply shown in the record, the Defendants could make
on showing whatsoever that there was any available evidence or any prejudice resultant from the granting of
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend its Complaint. (R. 208-210)
Appellants' second contention is that if the theory set
forth in the Second Amended Complaint would have
been brought forth at an earlier time, they may have
conducted further discovery.
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It should be noted that the entire evidence upon which
the decision of the lower court is based was available to
both the Defendants' counsel and the Defendants themselves long before the trial date.
For example, the conversation upon which the oral
guaranty is based took place in the presence of both
Defendants and their counsel, Mr. Peck. Surely, Defendants' counsel cannot claim surprise from evidence
which was introduced from a conversation at which he
was present. All other representations and conversations
mentioned in the record involve Farrell J. Jones. Other
than Jones' denial that he audibly agreed to guarantee
the account in the initial January conversation of the
parties, Mr. Jones was unable to contradict any of the
testimony given by Watts, Osborne and Curtis.
None of the evidence produced at trial was new in
the sense of applying only to Plaintiffs' theory of oral
guaranty. The amendment brought in no new facts or
circumstances, but only applied a different legal theory
to the same facts of which the Defendants and their
counsel were already aware.
The trial court was fully informed of the circumstances surrounding the amendment of the complaint.
The trial court had extensive discussions prior to the
trial with the counsel for the parties with respect to the
Amendment to the Complaint and the availability of
the disputed witness. The trial court was fully informed
as to the circumstances surrounding the Amendment of
the Complaint and under the circumstances set forth
above, this Court should not overturn the informed
judgment of the lower court.
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POINT III.
THE WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE AMPLY SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING THAT AN ORAL GUARANTY WAS
MADE BY FARRELL J. JONES.

In Appellants' brief it is contended that because of
the testimony of Jones that he did not consent to guaranteeing the account, the weight of the evidence resolves
the dispute in favor of the fact that there was no oral
guaranty.
It should be pointed out that the testimony of the
three witnesses for the Plaintiff was virtually uncontradicted, except with respect to the statement made by
Mr. Jones that he did not state in the initial conversation
that he would guarantee the account. All other facts,
including the transmittal of the proposed guarantees, the
telephone conversations, the sale of goods and all other
factors which constitute Plaintiff's case are uncontradicted. Respondent submits that if one looks at the record
in its entirety and considers the admitted acts of Defendant Jones, the only theory which is consistent with those
acts is that Jones orally guaranteed the account with the
Plaintiff, that he intended that his agreement be evidenced in writing and that he acted throughout as though
he thought he was liable.
The weight and sufficiency of the evidence is overwhelmingly in support of the lower court's decision.
CONCLUSION
It is quite clear that the evidence supports the position that Jones and Robinson orally agreed to guarantee
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the account owed by Associated Bolt to All Metals. That
in reliance thereon All Metals began to ship merchandise to Associated Bolt. That despite repeated opportunities Jones never gave any hint that he claimed he was
not liable on his guaranty and that Jones and Robinson
are now estopped to deny their liability by asserting the
Statute of Frauds.
The Judge did not err by allowing Plaintiff's Complaint to be amended, since Appellants' were not prejudiced in their defense to the claim.
The weight and sufficiency of the evidence clearly
supports the findings and judgment of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
HARDIN A. WHITNEY
JEFFREY N. CLAYTON
of the firm of
MOYLE & DRAPER
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent
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